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NOTES

it as applied to cocaine. The standard evidently must be the probability
that the drug was obtained from a legal source.
The various tests for the validity of a presumption, despite their differences in language, operate in essentially the same manner. Also, there is
little difference in the end result of the "reasonability" test of Mobile, the
"trational connection" test of Tot, and the "more likely than not" test of
Leary. In fact each of these three landmark cases was decided without overturning any previous test. The Court in Turner hints at a new test when
it states that the conviction would stand even if judged "by the more exacting reasonable-doubt standard normally applicable in criminal cases . ...,,
Even this test, when applied to the validity of a presumption, would be
essentially a question of reasonability.
The danger arises from the ease with which the standard of reasonability
may, in drug cases, become burdened with a mathematical interpretation. In
Turner possession of 275 glassine bags containing seven grams of heroin
was held to establish purchase or distribution, while possession of a sugar
solution containing one gram of cocaine was not. Evidence that domestic
production of heroin amounted to less than one per cent of the amount
smuggled supported a conviction, while evidence indicating that some five
kilograms of cocaine were stolen in a year in which some 85 kilograms
were imported did not.
The danger is obvious. As more cases are reviewed, the Court may gradually drift toward a mathematical standard of reasonability, which will be
used to convict a defendant whose guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If, for example, the Court sustained a conviction when the
evidence established that ninety-five per cent of the drug in question was
of foreign origin, then by implication the Court would announce the rule
that a ninety-five per cent probability establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Such a precedent might force the Court either to extend the mathematical test to other cases or to admit that the original defendant was convicted on something less than a reasonable-doubt standard.
Burk E.Bishop

Standing To Sue by the Victim of Racial Discrimination
Cheryl and James Walker rented an apartment from the defendant.
They were evicted allegedly because of their failure to pay the rent on time,
and because of other tenants' complaints of noise.' The Walkers, contending they were evicted because they had entertained Negro guests,2 filed a
51Id.

at 416.

'Although the rental records showed that the rent was paid late, they also revealed that many
other tenants made their payments on the same day or after the plaintiffs and none of these other
tenants was evicted for late payment. There was evidence that the plaintiffs were loud, but no
complaint was made to the management of the apartment or to the plaintiffs.
aDiscrimination against Negroes was the apparent policy of the apartment owners. To avoid
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complaint against the apartment owner in federal district court, seeking
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1982.' That statute provides that "All citizens of
the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as
is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property."4 The jurisdiction of the court was
challenged on the ground that the plaintiffs were "white citizens," and that
the statute applied only to Negroes. Held: 42 U.S.C. § 1982 protects all
citizens who are the victims of discrimination that is directed against
Negroes. Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
I. PROTECTION OF THE WHITE VICTIM OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

The ConstitutionalBasis and Scope of Section 1982. The thirteenth amendment provides for the abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude except as punishment for a criminal conviction.' Pursuant to the enabling
clause of the amendment, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866."
Section I of the 1866 Act, now 42 U.S.C. § 1982, extends the right to hold
and convey real and personal property to the Negro. However, some congressmen questioned the federal government's constitutional authority to
enact laws which would be binding on the states.! This and other factors
led to the passage of the fourteenth amendment.! After this amendment
was ratified, Congress re-enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act." The re-enactment created confusion as to the constitutional basis and the extent of the
statute. If the Act was passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, it
would be limited to preventing state-sanctioned discrimination." However,
if it was based on the thirteenth amendment, it would also reach private
discrimination against Blacks in the purchase and sale of property.
Cases interpreting the scope of the thirteenth amendment and the constitutional basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 added to the confusion.
Some courts found the amendment abolished not only slavery per se, but
also the incidents of slavery, including the gamut of racial discrimination
renting to Negroes, the defendants maintained fictitious leases with fictitious deposit checks. If a
prospective Negro tenant doubted that an apartment had actually been rented, these fictitious
records were shown to him. Testimony showed that the owners disliked not only Negroes, but also
those who associated with them.
a 4 2 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
4 Id.
a U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. See also Comment, Racial Dis-

crimination and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 23 Sw. L.J. 373 (1969).
7

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866). See also id. at 2461, 2498, 2506, 2896,
3035. Senator Poland of Vermont stated: "It certainly seems desirable that no doubt should be
left existing as to the power of Congress to enforce principles lying at the very foundation of all
republican government if they be denied or violated by the States, and I cannot doubt but that
every.Senator will rejoice in aiding to remove all doubt upon this power of Congress." Id. at 2961.
11H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 94-95 (1908); J. TENBROER,
EQUAL UNDER LAW 201-03 (1965); Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 9 NAT'L B.J. 27, 69 (1951).
'Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
"Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322
(E.D. Ark. 1903).
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and prejudice." Others interpreted the thirteenth amendment as prohibiting
only involuntary servitude.13 In addition, early decisions indicated that the
thirteenth amendment was the basis of the 1866 Act," while later decisions
considered the statute to be based on the fourteenth amendment.'
The confusion created by Congress' re-enactment of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act after ratification of the fourteenth amendment, and the contradictory conclusions of cases which had interpreted the thirteenth amendment and the constitutional authority for the Act, left the amendment's
scope and the statute's basis unsettled until the 1968 Supreme Court decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co."4 There, the Court held that the
1866 Civil Rights Act was based on the thirteenth amendment, and that it
prohibited all private and public discrimination."
In Jones the petitioner sought to buy a house and lot from the respondent real estate agency. The offer was refused for the sole reason that the
petitioner was a Negro. In finding for the petitioner, the Court relied specifically on the 1866 Civil Rights Act, stating that Congress intended the
statute to reach all forms of racial discrimination, whether practiced by the
state or by private persons. Reasoning that the legislation was not passed
merely to nullify racist laws of the Confederacy, but rather to eliminate
the institutions which had made the Negro an inferior citizen, 8 the Court
held that the scope of the 1866 Act was not altered by the 1870 re-enactment." It admitted that some congressmen supported the fourteenth
amendment because they feared the Act to be unconstitutional, but the
Court found that the re-adoption in no way shifted the basis of the statute
from the thirteenth to the fourteenth amendment." Although the Court
said that the thirteenth amendment gave Congress the "power ... to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery. . . ,""it did not expressly state what incidents of slavery are prohibited by the amendment itself.
Neither did the Court specifically determine whether the 1866 Act prohibits all discrimination, whether the victim be black or white.
"Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark.
1903). The basic connotation of the phrase "incidents of slavery" is explained by Justice Bradley
in the Civil Rights Cases:
Congress . . . by the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 . . . undertook to wipe out these
burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, constituting its [incidents
of slavery] substance and visible form; and to secure to all citizens of every race and
color, and without regard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are
the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.
109 U.S. at 22.
saCorrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
' United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (No. 14,897)
(C.C.D. La. 1874) (Bradley,
Circuit Justice); In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (No. 14,247) (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (Chase, Circuit
Justice); United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (No. 16,151) (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (Swayne,
Circuit Justice).
'Hurd
v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1925); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
'6392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17Id. at 338-39.
I° at 426-27.
Id.
55
Id. at 436.
20 Id.
21 Id.
at 440.
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An Alternative Basis for Establishing Standing. As a general rule of practice, one cannot raise a constitutional objection unless he has been denied
rights protected by a constitutional provision."5 However, under certain
circumstances the courts have allowed exceptions to this general rule."5 One
such exception was applied in Barrows v. Jackson," where the petitioner
and respondent were parties to a covenant which restricted the use and
ownership of their property to whites. The petitioners sued the respondent
in a California state court for damages for breach of the covenant. The Negroes to whom the land was sold were not made parties to the suit, but the
respondent relied for her defense upon the invasion of the Negroes' fourteenth amendment right to equal protection. In affirming the state court's
refusal to enforce the restrictive covenant, the Supreme Court said: "Under
the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which is only a rule
of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights
which would be denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained."" The "peculiar circumstances" by which the Court justified its
departure from the general rule were: (1) the action of a state court might
result in a denial of constitutional rights to Negroes, (2) the white respondent would be penalized for affording the Negroes their constitutional
rights, and (3) the Negroes would not be the appropriate party to bring
the action for the white person's injury." Although the Court allowed the
white respondent to rely upon the Negro's rights, it did not set aside the
rule which normally precludes a person from asserting the rights of others.
Rather, it concluded that when justice so requires, the exception should be
applied.
II. STANDING OF WHITES

To SUE

In concluding that white victims of racial discrimination are protected
by 42 U.S.C. § 1982, the court in Walker v. Pointer7 included in its
opinion two complementary, but distinct, rationales. As the primary basis
for granting jurisdiction, the court interpreted Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co. to hold that the statute prohibits "all discrimination" and protects "all
citizens." As a secondary jurisdictional basis, the court, reasoning from
Barrows v. Jackson, held that white citizens have standing to sue when they
are victimized for vindicating Negro rights which are protected by the
statute.
The Jones' Rationale. In determining the scope of the statute, the court
looked to the purpose of the thirteenth amendment. It observed that the
2

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953).
"5Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
2346 U.S. 249 (1953).
5
1d. at 257.
1

16 1d. at 258-60.

"'304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
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amendment was enacted to free all men, and that it is not limited to the
protection of a specific race. The court found that the amendment was
intended to abolish all discrimination, including what traditionally has been

labeled "incidents of slavery." The district court extended the phrase to
encompass not only Negroes, but also whites who may suffer from this

stigma.
The court also looked to the original purpose and judicial interpretation
of the statute. As originally enacted, section 1982 was designed to implement the thirteenth amendment by providing for equal property rights.
The court placed specific emphasis on the first five words of the Act, interpreting "all citizens of the United States" to include white persons.
However, the statute later qualifies the right it guarantees by defining it as
"the same right . . .as is enjoyed by white citizens."" s The court resolved
this inherent statutory limitation by looking to the congressional debate
during the passage of the 1866 Act and the Supreme Court's decision in
Jones. Contrary to the district court's observation, congressional debate does
not conclusively show that the bill was intended to extend to the kind of
"incidents of slavery" and discrimination found in Walker." An incident
of slavery, as defined by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases," is a
disability to the Negro which, because of his color, has outlasted the
institution of slavery. Congressional debate prior to the passage of the
thirteenth amendment supports the contention that the amendment was
intended to destroy the institution of slavery and all its incidents which
impaired the rights of a free man." The Court in Jones seemed to uphold
this contention. However, it is questionable whether the Supreme Court
would go as far as the district court's interpretation of "incidents of slavery" and the breadth of section 1982. If the statute does not include such
discrimination, it is doubtful that a white person could have standing under
it. The district court concluded that under the Supreme Court's decision in
Jones, "all citizens" who are the victims of "racially motivated discrimination" have standing."2 The phrase "all citizens" was interpreted to include
members of any race. Undoubtedly, under section 1982 as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Jones, if a white person is discriminated against
because of his race or color, he may be protected by the statute. However,
in this case the Walkers were not evicted because of their race but because
of their associations with Negroes. Finding the Walkers to have standing,
the court interpreted the Jones phrase, "all racially motivated discrimination," to include the incident of racial discrimination presented inWalker.
See notes 3-4 supra, and accompanying text.
"'The district court quoted Senator Trumbull, the author of the bill: "[T]he bill would 'break
down all discrimination between black men and white men'." 304 F. Supp. at 59. However, prior
to itspassage, Senator Trumbull made some ambiguous statements concerning the application of
the bill to private, as well as state, actions. Possibly to assure the passage of the bill, he seemed
to shift his position from an all-encompassing bill to one prohibiting "State Legislatures from enslaving, under any pretense, those whom the first clause [of the thirteenth amenidment] declared
should be free." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1866) (emphasis added).
"Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
a"CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
'142 passim (1865). See also Comment, Racial Discrimination and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 23 Sw. L.J. 373 (1969).
a3 3 04 F. Supp. 56, 58-60 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
28
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It is questionable that either the 1866 Civil Rights Act or the Jones
decision was intended to include within the meaning of "incidents of
slavery" discrimination against whites which occurs solely because of their
associations with Negroes. To limit the coverage of the statute to those
persons who are actually discriminated against because of their race does
not read a racist purpose into the statute, as the court claims, but merely
restricts the scope of the statute's protection to that originally intended.
The Barrows' Rationale. The secondary ground on which the court based
the Walkers' standing is found by reading Barrows v. Jackson in connection
with Jones. The Supreme Court in Barrows recognized that one may be a
victim of racial discrimination without being a member of the specific race
which is discriminated against, but only by attempting to vindicate that
race's rights. This decision not only supports the district court's conclusion,
but sets forth an additional basis for the Walkers' standing. The jurisdictional prerequisites of Barrows were found to be present in Walker. First,
the Walkers had "suffered substantial harm" because of their extension of
the leasehold to Negro guests.3 For having black associates in their apartment, they were evicted. Second, in addition to the harm to the Walkers
there was also a denial of certain "lesser but cognizable property interests"
of Negro persons which are protected by section 19 8 2 ."* These lesser interests included the "freedom to 'go and come at pleasure' " and the possibility
of injury to potential "tangible property interests" such as the right to an
"implied easement of ingress and egress over the common area controlled
by defendants immediately adjacent to the Walker leasehold."' The
"breadth of section 1982," the court said, encompasses all property interests; if these interests are not protected, the Negro would be harmed
substantially." Third, in meeting the final prerequisite of Barrows the court
said: "[T]he failure to provide a remedy for racially motivated interruption of leaseholds would seriously diminish the willingness of whites in
general to entertain Negro guests." 7
Because Barrows arose under the fourteenth amendment and dealt with
constitutional rights, its application to Walker is necessarily restricted.
However, the court resolved this restriction by reading Barrows with Jones.
After Jones, state action is no longer a prerequisite for granting relief
under section 1982. Therefore, although Barrows did not interpret section
1982 and the rights vindicated were constitutional, its basic rationale is
applicable in the Walker case." The district court observed that Barrows

n id.
at 61-62.
4

3

id.

saId.
86Id. at 62.
37Id.at 61.

a An additional distinction, not discussed by the court, is that in Barrows the assertion of
another's rights was used defensively, whereas in Walker the plaintiffs were seeking affirmative
relief under a statute which protected another's rights. However, the Supreme Court recently permitted a white person to maintain an action under § 1982 when that person is punished for vindicating Negroes' rights protected by that statute. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229 (1969).
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departed from the general rule "that one cannot raise a constitutional objection" unless he is a member of the class denied a constitutional right."
Barrows recognized that this rule is followed unless the circumstances of
the case are so peculiar that justice would require an exception. As in
Barrows, the Walkers were the appropriate parties to bring the action and
were penalized for vindicating the rights of minorities, if it can be said that
they were injured for extending property interests to the Negroes. The
injury to the whites was obvious. But the court's basis for finding the denial
of property rights to Negroes is tenuous. "Implied easement," potential
"tangible property interests," and "an opportunity to receive possessory
interests"4 are intangible "property" rights which are encompassed by
section 1982 only by means of a strained interpretation of the statutory
language. ' However, if these interests can be said to be protected by the
statute, the Walkers would have standing under the rationale of the
Barrows' exception.
III. CONCLUSION

The two rationales from which the district court reasoned to reach its
conclusion that white victims of black racial discrimination have standing
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 are quite different, although they accomplish the
same results. The Jones rationale, as applied by the court, concentrates upon
the rights which the white citizen has under the statute. However, the
Barrows rationale shifts the focus from the rights denied the white to those
of the Negro, but allows the white citizen standing if he has been punished
for affording the Negro his rights.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted to assure the Negro those
rights deemed to be protected by the thirteenth amendment. Because the
assaults upon the Negro's freedom were so flagrant, it is doubtful that the
thirty-ninth Congress even contemplated that a white could be discriminated against. Amazingly, after over a hundred years, this problem has
only recently begun to be confronted by the courts. The Supreme Court
in the landmark decision of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. concluded that if
a white is discriminated against because of his color, he has a remedy under
42 U.S.C. § 1982. The district court expanded the language of Jones and
the protection of the statute to include those citizens who are victimized
not because of their race but that of their companions. The social desirability of the court's objective is not questioned. But because there is some
doubt as to the extent of the protection of the statute, the preferable basis
for the decision is the rationale of Barrows. It does not require the plaintiff
to be a member of the race denied a statutory right, as may be required by
the statute as it has been interpreted and applied.
Alton C. Todd
aa304 F. Supp. at 61-62.
40Id.

4'See note 4 supra, and accompanying text. See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396

U.S. 229 (1969).
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